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ABSTRACT 
Bonuses – which are often used to mitigate principal-agent problems and to encourage employees to 
work harder – have increased tremendously in the financial sector during the last decade, and have 
often been seen as a contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008. The recent European Union (EU) 
action to adopt a policy that restricts bonuses paid to bankers may seem promising at first, but this 
does not  address the real issues behind variable rewards. Compensation policies should be changed to 
encourage responsible risk-taking and decision-making through the implementation of broader 
performance metrics, forfeitable holdbacks and hybrid bonds. Furthermore, a change in organisational 
culture is needed to improve ethical behaviour leading to a re-balancing of stakeholders’ interests in 
the financial sector. 
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Introduction 
 
In order to mitigate the principal-agent problem 
and, thereby aligning the interests of the 
management to the stakeholders of financial 
organizations, managers received bonuses which 
were linked to the financial performance. The 
bonuses received by employees as a share of the 
total compensation in the financial sector has 
increased incredibly during the last decade (Bell & 
Van Reenen 2010). Although bonuses may 
stimulate employees to work harder (Gehrig et al. 
2008), these variable rewards have encouraged 
excessive risk taking through short term 
orientation in the financial sector, and this was 
seen as one of the contributing factors to the 
financial crisis of 2008.  
 
Political Response 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 and its 
consequences to the real economy have led to 
various political leaders pushing for legislation to 
regulate the financial business and limit the 
associated variable compensations. Partly driven 
by these proposals, some financial players have 
adjusted their compensation policies (Moore et al. 
2013) while others seem reluctant to change their 
incentive systems (Touryalai 2013).  
 
In the European Union (EU), the European 
Parliament has recently approved a policy that 
restricts the bonuses paid to bankers (The New 
York Times, 2013). As a result upfront cash awards 
are limited and banks are obliged to set at least 
fifty per cent of their bonuses apart for three to 
five years. This proposal is supported by several 
papers, including Bebchuk and Fried (2009) and 
                                                        
1  EU Centre Research Intern, July--December 2013. The 
views expressed in this working paper are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU or 
the EU Centre in Singapore. 
Sanjai Bhagat and Romano (2009), which argue 
that this policy would stimulate a longer-term view 
among managers instead of a short-term focus. 
This structure aims to eliminate the incentive to 
temporarily boost financial performance in one 
year at the expense of others. Given that a trend 
towards more deferred compensation already 
exists and thus is already partly embedded in the 
culture (see Figure 1), it would be easier to 
implement further postponed remuneration. 
However, legislation labelling the entire financial 
sector as similar is scientifically challenged (Curran 
et al. 2012). The nature of the respective banking 
activities should preferably be considered in order 
to match the deferral period to the associated 
risks.  
 
Additionally, the European Parliament’s policy tries 
to encourage financial corporations to attract and 
reward employees through other channels 
including flexible working hours, educational 
opportunities and career development (Mercer 
2013).  
 
Although this seems promising at first sight, reality 
reveals a different story. The truth is that these 
regulations address the symptoms of the variable 
rewards rather than the true causes (The 
Economist 2012). Base salaries are expected to rise 
thereby compensating for the lower variable 
remunerations. As a consequence, the fixed labour 
costs of banks are expected to rise. Variable 
payments, in contrast, vary in accordance to the 
financial performance. The proposed legislation, 
thus, weakens the financial position if revenues do 
not live up to the expectations. Moreover, the 
obligation of offering deferred compensation may 
result in bigger variable compensation since 
employees want to be compensated for the lower 
present value of their bonus compared to the new 
remuneration (The Economist 2012).  
 
True Causes and Solutions 
 
In order to effectively evaluate the potential of 
these measures, the true causes of excessive risk-
taking and the related variable compensations 
should be scrutinised. First of all, excessive risk-
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taking by employees is rooted in the difference 
between debt and equity. That is, bonds entail a 
fixed claim on a firm’s assets which is repaid if the 
organisation has sufficient funds and stakeholders 
will acquire the remainder of the earnings. 
However, if the bond’s value exceeds the assets’ 
value the bondholder will suffer. Since employees’ 
remuneration often consist of stock options their 
behaviour is, thus, more likely to be risk seeking 
which contrasts to financial stability that society as 
a whole would like to have.  
 
To prevent this conflict in interests, bond-like 
features should be added to the personnel’s 
variable compensations. Firstly, instead of cash-in 
rewards the variable remuneration should be 
deferred for at least a couple of years and be 
forfeitable if the financial institution’s performance 
declines or worst, when it needs governmental 
support. These compensation holdbacks align the 
employees’ incentives to bondholders’ meaning 
that the compensation has a restricted upside and 
a considerable downside (Small 2013) and, 
therefore, the interests of employees are aligned 
with taxpayers’ (Curran et al. 2012). 
 
Another option would be to offer employees 
hybrid bonds, a debt instrument that will 
automatically be converted into equity once a firm 
financially struggles. This option will offer a 
financial institution a buffer of equity and thereby 
limits the possibility of needed governmental 
support (Small 2013). Synergy effects are created if 
both options would be implemented, that is, the 
price of contingent debt will be dependent on 
investors’ beliefs about management’s willingness 
to forego compensation and thereby issue new 
equity. Contingent debt will rise in price if bond 
investors presume managers will recapitalize the 
firm before it crosses the threshold for conversion 
of debt to equity. 
 
Moreover, it is questionable whether the current 
determination of bonuses which highly focuses on 
the organisation’s stock performance is a sound 
variable to reflect managers’ performance. Linking 
the variable compensation to more variables is 
likely to broaden the currently narrow view 
adopted by executives and thereby enhancing the 
long-term soundness of the organisation (Sharma 
2012). Ideally, these additional measures would be 
sound indicators for the corporation’s long-term 
performance. One of these options would be to tie 
variable compensation to a combination of the 
value of common shares, preferred shares and 
bonds (Bebchuk & Spamann 2009). The aggregate 
value could also be adjusted by governmental 
support to the financial institution and thereby 
inversely relating it to bonuses. This restructuring 
of the performance management would foster 
managers to evaluate a range of consequences of 
their actions rather than just the effect on the 
stock price and will therefore reduce the likelihood 
of excessive risk-taking.  
 
On top of the malfunctioning of monetary 
compensation the financial sector also suffers from 
several structural impediments. One of these 
factors is peer comparison which fosters herding 
(Drasic & Velinova 2011). In essence, this means 
that individual risk-seeking behaviour is stimulated 
through the risk-taking norm in the herd. 
Moreover, an institutional, monetary pressure 
exists to outperform peers and thereby initiates 
riskier behaviour. Although individual managers 
may realize they are taking on excessive risk, it pays 
off to stay and conform to the crowd. This group 
process evolves into a market herding trend and 
thereby increased the volatility of the entire 
financial sector. Therefore, the hindsight effect 
should be eradicated, that is, success as well as 
failure should be attributed to the manager instead 
of the company as a whole. Furthermore, 
teamwork should be one of the determinants for 
rewards rather than a competitive force and 
excessive individualism.  
 
Another structural deficiency is the asymmetry in 
compensation and unemployment incentives. 
Whereas high returns are significantly 
compensated, unemployment incentives are hardly 
present (Drasic & Velinova 2011). This dichotomy 
encourages risk-seeking behaviour if investments 
are poorly performing.  
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Call for Cultural Change 
 
However, just restructuring compensation schemes 
might not trigger an ultimate turnaround. Noe and 
Young (2012) argue in their paper that the 
structure of financial products may suggest a sound 
performance even over a long period of time when 
in actual fact there still exist a hidden risk. 
Secondly, the authors state that the complexity of 
financial products and the size of banking 
corporations hamper effective monitoring of risky 
activities. Therefore, the authors call for extra 
attention on ethical behaviour among financial 
managers.  
 
As a means to improve ethical behaviour in the 
financial sector, the organisational culture, being 
its primary determinant, should be improved (Lim 
et al. 2010). A cultural change seems to be 
necessary as fifty per cent of financial managers 
indicated that negative public perception of the 
banking sector is a fair representation of the recent 
past, and only eight per cent believed that these 
problems of the banking culture belong to the past 
(CIPD 2013). The challenge for human resource 
departments is to realise such a cultural change. 
Many critics have questioned whether bankers are 
aware of their primary function in society - that is 
to channel funds to sound investments instead of 
regarding personal gains as their main goal. To 
achieve this ambition, Barclays introduced a 
‘balanced scorecard’ to evaluate its staff (Barclays 
2012). Core values include service, excellence, 
stewardship, respect and integrity. However, a 
single initiative is unlikely to establish a rigorous 
shift in the culture within the financial sector.  
 
KPMG (2013) has outlined additional steps that 
should be taken to realise a transformational 
change in the culture of the financial sector. Firstly, 
the commitment of senior management to 
transformational change is crucial since role-
modelling of values appears to be vital to make 
change happen. By adopting a cultural change, 
decisive leadership is portrayed which will prevent 
the re-emergence of behaviour which is 
unacceptable. Moreover, a rigorous approach 
should be taken to monitor risk-takers, that is, 
those individuals that deviate from prescribed, 
expected behaviour (Deloitte 2012). All these 
should be included in the overall risk management 
and controlled by the human resource department. 
The change in culture could be promoted through 
symbolic actions that convey the determination of 
the financial institutions to a cultural change, for 
example, scrapping business activities that are 
being perceived as contentious and radical 
overhauling of traditional norms. Rabobank, a 
Dutch multinational bank, engaged in this practise 
by voluntarily eradicating bonuses for its board 
members (Schäfer 2013). 
 
In order to foster professionalism among bankers 
and regain society’s trust in the industry as a 
whole, several practices should be initiated. Firstly, 
the financial sector should refocus its attention on 
the customer. Currently only one third of the 
financial managers believe shareholders are the 
most important stakeholders (CIPD 2013). Through 
organisation-individual relationship management, 
human resource departments should integrate a 
customer-centric mentality in financial institutions. 
In addition, compensation could be tied to 
customer satisfaction through an evaluation 
procedure. Moreover, professional standards 
should be developed to promote ethical awareness 
among professionals and thereby foster a stimulus 
in societal confidence in the entire sector. Aside 
realigning compensation policies, financial 
institutions should clearly communicate on how 
pay is determined to encourage transparency and 
enforce desirable behaviours (Institute of 
International Finance 2009).  
 
Evaluation by the Sector 
 
The proposed measures have been evaluated by 
several employees of the financial sector (who are 
not named for the purpose of privacy). Below are 
some of their comments regard the viability of the 
proposed policies and potential obstacles which 
might hinder the implementation: 
 
A senior officer in the Central Bank Reporting 
Team, at a Singapore multinational bank, with $252 
billion total assets and a net income of $2 billion in 
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2012, acknowledged the importance of a revised 
variable compensation policy. However this 
individual also expressed his doubts regarding the 
viability of a cultural change. A change in culture is 
hard to establish because the decision-makers, that 
is, the “top management, will not personally 
benefit; instead they will see their total income 
decline.” The importance of societal pressure by 
either the customer or the government is needed 
to promote this necessary change. Moreover, 
“cultural change is a solution, but only in the long 
run”. To strengthen the sector’s image in the short 
term, the sector should convey its determination 
to fundamental change and should implement 
changes in services that are observable by the 
customer. 
 
Another insight is given by a compliance controller 
employed by a Dutch multinational bank, serving 
7.5 million clients with an aggregate worth of €752 
billion in financial assets. “Variable compensation 
can lead to more focused results if they are aligned 
with the goals of the financial institution. However, 
individual performance should not be the sole 
determinant of variable compensation because 
that would worsen team performance.” Regarding 
the recommendations, the controller felt that “The 
proposed solutions are valid, but might be limited 
in their effectiveness given the intrinsic endeavour 
of individuals to gain rewards. It will take a long 
time to inhibit this natural drive.” In addition, an 
international, collaborative approach is needed to 
solve this problem: “Given the international 
character of financial institution, it is relatively easy 
to evade national restrictions or legislation. 
Therefore, global measures are called for. Because 
of the high influence of the financial sector on the 
real economy and in particular, its impact on retail, 
wholesale and small and medium enterprises, 
measures should be taken quickly in order to 
restore trust in the sector and restore economic 
prosperity”. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Altogether, the financial sector needs structural 
change to depart from the past. Changes in various 
human resource policies are necessary to reach 
that state. In essence, compensation policies 
should be changed to encourage responsible risk-
taking and decision-making. Ideally, these new 
compensation systems should solve the difference 
between equity and debt. Implementation of 
broader performance metrics, forfeitable 
holdbacks and hybrid bonds could reach such an 
end. Likewise, financial culture should be 
reformed. Reorientation of the core values of the 
financial institutions should be realised through 
changes in ethical behaviour leading to a re-
balancing of stakeholders’ interests. These changes 
are essential to recover the trust in the sector by 
the society. However, as expressed by individuals 
working in the sector, the practical implementation 
might be difficult to attain and therefore initiatives 
should have a global character. Additionally, social 
pressure should function as a catalyst to engender 
serious structural changes. 
 
Figure 1. Total compensation trend for managing directors: pay levels  
and cash vs. deferral split (Curran, M., Gundy, G., & Watson, T. (2012).
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